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I. INTRODUCTION
T is all the rage to criticize lawyers and attribute denigration of the legal
profession to the unscrupulous tactics of the "Rambo" lawyer. What
many people, both within and outside the legal community, fail to grasp
is that the maladies of the profession are not exclusively, or even primarily,
attributable to the zealous advocate. Rather, the lawyer is part of an adver-
sarial system that arms the attorney with various rules which encourage, and
*This article is adapted from a thesis submitted by the author in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the Graduate Program for Judges at the University of Virginia.
** Justice, Supreme Court of Texas; LL.M., University of Virginia School of Law, Grad-
uate Program for Judges; J.D. and B.A., Southern Methodist University. Special thanks to
Margaret Henning, of Morgan & Weisbrod, Dallas (former briefing attorney with the Court of
Appeals, Fifth District of Texas at Dallas) for her invaluable assistance.
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sometimes require, the lawyer to use the very tactics that subject the profes-
sion to overwhelming criticism. Furthermore, there is a real tension in a
system that places a duty on a lawyer to zealously advocate on behalf of the
client while simultaneously observing a duty to the court.
A variety of rules and codes have emerged to attempt to curb the incivility
of lawyers. Rather than having a curative effect, these rules and codes have
spurred and threaten to continue to spur additional litigation and have com-
pounded the incivility problem. A viable solution to the problem is to alter
the focus from rules designed to punish the lawyer for over-zealousness to
rules which eliminate the tools by which the lawyer abuses the system.
Rules favoring automatic disclosure and focusing the scope of initial discov-
ery during the pre-trial stage are a promising step in that direction.
[W]e judicially know that litigation is conducted today in a manner far
different from years past. Whether the increased size of the bar has de-
creased collegiality, or the legal profession has become only a business, or
experienced lawyers have ceased to teach new lawyers the standards to be
observed, or because of other factors not readily categorized, we observe
patterns of behavior that forebode ill for our system of justice. - Dondi
Properties I
A. DoNDI PROPERTIES CORP. V. COMMERCE SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION
Courts have authority to impose a variety of sanctions designed to control
the conduct of litigants and attorneys. Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce
Savings and Loan Association 2 enumerates the various sources of that au-
thority.3 In Dondi the judges of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas adopted standards of lawyer conduct from a ci-
vility code and required the standards to be followed under threat of sanc-
tions. This action was in response to "a problem that, though of relatively
recent origin, is so pernicious that it threatens to delay the administration of
justice and to place litigation beyond the financial reach of litigants." '4
The opinion addressed two actions before the court, Dondi Properties
Corp. v. Commerce Savings and Loan Association and Knight v. Protective
Life Insurance Co. 5 In Dondi, the magistrate was presented with over
twenty pleadings and letters comprising various defendants' motions for
sanctions involving the plaintiffs' alleged noncompliance with discovery or-
ders. 6 Additionally, sanctions were requested against one plaintiff's counsel
for contacting a witness without informing the witness that he was an attor-
ney representing the plaintiffs.7 In Knight, the plaintiff moved to strike a
1. Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D. 284, 286 (N.D.
Tex. 1988) (en banc and per curiam).
2. Id. at 284.
3. Id. at 287. The court primarily relies on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 16(f) and
37, 18 U.S.C. § 401, and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Id.
4. Id. at 286.
5. Id. at 285.
6. Dondi, 121 F.R.D. at 289.
7. Id. at 290.
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brief filed in violation of a local rule that required leave of court.8 After
standards of conduct were set by the district court, both the judge in Knight 9
and the magistrate in Dondi 10 denied the motions for sanctions.
In addition to noting the sources of the court's sanction authority to re-
quire civility, Dondi also discusses the court's inherent power to regulate the
administration of justice. " But, the Dondi court does not elaborate on the
conduct it seeks to control. In addition, other than the facts outlined in
conjunction with the sanctions requested in the Dondi actions, no evidence
of the prevalence of these practices is proffered, although in a footnote, the
court cites a report by the Texas Bar Foundation that recounts observations
by leading judges, lawyers, and legal educators of inappropriate conduct.' 2
The lack of concrete examples is perhaps because, as one commentator ob-
served (with apologies to Justice Stewart), the problem is like pornography;
it may not be readily defined, but "you know it when you see it."' 3
Dondi is unique because it takes aspirational standards set forth in a vol-
untary civility code and makes them mandatory. The standards described in
Dondi are enforceable as follows:
Malfeasant counsel can expect . . . an appropriate response from the
court, including the range of sanctions the Fifth Circuit suggests in the
Rule 11 context: "a warm friendly discussion on the record, a hard-
nosed reprimand in open court, compulsory legal education, monetary
sanctions, or other measures appropriate to the circumstances."'14
B. THE PROBLEM
Tension has always existed in our adversary system of justice between the
lawyer's duty of zealous advocacy for the client, and that same lawyer's duty
to the court and the system of justice generally. Rules of conduct developed
for lawyers throughout this century, while confirming that an attorney's first
duty is to the client, still subject that duty to limits imposed by the attorney's
duty to the court. Early on, these limits were not much more than simply
prohibiting the lawyer from committing a fraud upon the court. However,
recent years have seen the evolution of procedural rules designed to force
counsel to permit discovery where objecting is baseless, and prohibit counsel
from making baseless discovery requests. This could be considered a second
level of limitation on the lawyer's duty to the client. Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is also on this second level. Rule 11 requires law-
yers not only to avoid misleading activities and harassing the opponent, but
also to conduct a diligent review of the client's claim before asserting it in
8. Id. at 286.
9. Id. at 292.
10. Id. at 290.
11. Dondi, 121 F.R.D. at 287.
12. Id. at 286 n.6 (citing Texas Bar Foundation Conference on Professionalism (Dec.
1984)).
13. Robert N. Sayler, Rambo Litigation: Why Hardball Tactics Don't Work, 74 A.B.A. J.
78, 79 (Mar. 1988); cf Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
14. Dondi, 121 F.R.D. at 288 (quoting Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc.. 836 F.2d 866,
878 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc)).
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court.' 5 These rules heighten the tension between zealous advocacy and
duty to the court and the system of justice because lawyers are required to
"judge" their client's position.
Overlaying this second level, now, is the civility code. Is Dondi taking the
civility code movement from an effort to address the sagging public image of
lawyers and a simple plea for collegial relations in the legal community, to a
substantive development, the result of which is to raise the tension between
lawyer as advocate and as officer of the court to an explosive level? That is
to say, is the legal profession's concern about professionalism forcing counsel
to, not only temper their duty to the client with a conflicting duty to the
justice system but, for the sake of "cooperation," give the benefit of the
doubt to the opposition?
Today, legally binding canons of ethics have been adopted in every juris-
diction across the United States. 16 Federal and state rules of procedure have
been enacted or amended to sanction improper litigation practices.' 7 Also,
an increasing number of voluntary bar associations as well as a growing
number of integrated bars are adopting creeds of professionalism, commonly
referred to as "civility codes."' 8 Most recently, all this effort has been di-
rected at the problems caused by "Rambo" litigators who employ "hard-
ball" tactics.1 9 A question should be posed, however, as to whether the
methods used to curb these practices are valid.
First, it is debatable whether "sharp" practices are as pervasive as some
have implied. Arguably they are no more prevalent than in the past except
that there are just more lawyers.20 These practices and the concerns of the
bench, bar, and general public are not recent phenomena but are both long-
15. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
16. E. Wayne Thode, The Ethical Standard for the Advocate, 39 TEX. L. REV. 575, 577
(1961).
17. J. D. Page & Doug Sigel, The Inherent and Express Powers of Courts to Sanction, 31 S.
TEX. L.J. 43, 46-69 (1990).
18. See Interim Report of the Committee on Civility of the Seventh Federal Judicial Cir-
cuit, 141 F.R.D. 371, 422-23 (1991) [hereinafter Interim Report on Civility] (noting that ethical
creeds are used by the following bars: Akron (Ohio), Arizona, American Bar Ass'n Tort and
Insurance Practice Section, Dallas (Texas), Hillsborough County (Florida), Houston (Texas),
Kansas City (Missouri), Kentucky, Lafayette County (Mississippi), Los Angeles County (Cali-
fornia), Maine, Massachusetts, Memphis and Shelby County (Tennessee), Mississippi, Mon-
tana, Multnomah (Oregon), Nashville (Tennessee), Nebraska, North Carolina, Pulaski County
(Arkansas), Shreveport (Louisiana), and Texas); Catherine T. Clarke, Missed Manners in
Courtroom Decorum, 50 MD. L. REV. 945, 949 n.10 (1991) (adding El Paso County (Colo-
rado), Hinds County (Mississippi), and Oregon Association of Defense Counsel & Oregon
Trial Lawyer's Association); Eugene Cook et al., A Guide to the Texas Lawyer's Creed. A
Mandate for Professionalism, 10 REV. LITIG. 673, 691 (1991) (adding Austin (Texas)), Corpus
Christi (Texas), and Texas Trial Lawyers' Association and Texas Association of Defense
Counsel); William A. Brewer, III & Francis B. Majorie, One Year After Dondi." Time to Get
Back to Litigating?, 17 PEEP. L. REV. 833, 833 n.l (1990) (adding American College of Trial
Lawyers, Beverly Hills (California), Colorado, and Louisville (Kentucky)); Foster D. Arnett,
The Trial Lawyer and Lawyering." Personal Values and Perceptions, 33 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE
121, 122 (1989) (adding Cleveland (Ohio), Florida, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Rhode
Island, and Virginia).
19. Brewer & Majorie, supra note 18, at 833-34.
20. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 1.4.1 (West 1986) (lawyer popu-
lation has increased from 41,000 in 1870 to 530,000 in 1980).
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standing and historically recorded. Second, much of the "hard" in "hard-
ball" is derived from the actuality that someone has insisted on strict adher-
ence to the rules of procedure, local rules of court, and legal customs.
Finally, in this light, could it be said that courts, attempting to stem the tide
of gamesmanship, have created rules that in fact exacerbate the game and
send the search for truth to the showers?
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Dissatisfaction with the administration of justice is as old as law.
[D]iscontent has an ancient and unbroken pedigree. - Roscoe Pound 2'
A. BIRTH OF RAMBO
To be sure, much is being written today about incivility in litigation and
between opposing attorneys.22 Rambo, the movie hero willing to fight to the
death, is the vogue term used to describe the combative lawyer. 23 Rambo
lawyers are accused of employing sharp practices, offensive or excessive
gamesmanship, uncivil litigation maneuvers, and'hardball tactics. 24 As ex-
pected, the public views this behavior as the natural consequence of the pro-
fession's motivation of greed and the thrill of winning the game, rather than
a result of the nature of our adversary system. Although there is much ado
over the "recent" birth of the Rambo lawyer, plenty was said about ques-
tionable practices of lawyers in previous decades. Lawyers have been dis-
liked by the public for centuries.
One of the earliest recorded statements against lawyers was written in ap-
proximately 300 B.C. by Plato, the Greek philosopher, condemning the
21. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Jus-
tice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395, 395 (1906).
22. See, e.g., S.G. Supply Co. v. Greenwood Int'l, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 1430, 1443 n.l (N.D.
III. 1991) (inordinate, unjustified burden on the court is created due to counsels' hardball tac-
tics); Dondi, 121 F.R.D. at 286 (valuable judicial and attorney time is spent on unnecessary
conflicts and sharp practices between lawyers); Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 115 F.R.D.
292, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (case was "marred from its inception by incivility and a consistent
lack of cooperation between counsel"); Arnett, supra note 18, at 122 (noting that the media
writes of the lack of legal professionalism "ad infinitum, ad nauseam and without surcease");
Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 597-600
(1985) (detailing procedural abuses); Noel Fidel, Waltz Me Around Again, Willie ... Reflec-
tions on Discovery Practice, Sharp Elbows, Junk Yard Dogs, and the Elusive Spirit of Coopera-
tion, 27 FOR THE DEF. 26, 26 (Jan. 1985) (modern litigation is replete with endless, needless
discovery clashes).
23. See, e.g., Eugene Cook et al., A Guide to the Texas Lawyer's Creed: A Mandate for
Professionalism, 10 REV. LITIG. 673, 674 (1991) (Rambo litigators have hired-gun mentality
and use combative tactics); Interim Report on Civility, at 22 (incivility in litigation attributed
to general meanness and Rambo tactics); Walter K. Olson, System Overload, 77 A.B.A. J. 70,
70 (Oct. 1991) (Rambo lawyers carry on like schoolyard bullies); Thomas M. Reavley, Rambo
Litigators: Pitting Aggressive Tactics Against Legal Ethics, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 637, 637 (1990)
(Rambo lawyers have "take no prisoners" attitude).
24. For some anecdotal accounts of Rambo tactics, see Judge Sidney A. Fitzwater, To-
ward a Renaissance of Professionalism in Trial Advocacy, 20 TEX. TECH L. REV. 787, 789-92




"small and unrighteous" soul of the lawyer.25 Between the years 300-500
A.D., some of the most prestigious law schools turned out hordes of young
lawyers who invaded this "lucrative science ... hot for riches."'26 The De-
cline and Fall of the Roman Empire has this interesting passage regarding
new members of the Roman Empire bar:
In the practice of the bar these men had considered reason as the instru-
ment of dispute; they interpreted the laws according to the dictates of
private interest; and the same pernicious habits might still adhere to
their characters in the public administration of the state. The honour of
a liberal profession has indeed been vindicated by ancient and modern
advocates, who have filled the most important stations with pure integ-
rity and consummate wisdom; but in the decline of Roman jurispru-
dence the ordinary promotion of lawyers was pregnant with mischief
and disgrace. The noble art, which had once been preserved as the sa-
cred inheritance of the patricians, was fallen into the hands of freedmen
and plebeians, who, with cunning rather than with skill, exercised a
sordid and pernicious trade. Some of them procured admittance into
families for the purpose of fomenting differences, of encouraging suits,
and of preparing a hatvest of gain for themselves or their brethren.
Others, recluse in their chambers, maintained the gravity of legal
professors, by furnishing a rich client with subtleties to confound the
plainest truth, and with arguments to colour the most unjustifiable
pretensions. The splendid and popular class was composed of the advo-
cates, who filled the Forum with the sound of their turgid and loqua-
cious rhetoric. Careless of fame and of justice, they are described for
the most part as ignorant and rapacious guides, who conducted their
clients through a maze of expense, of delay, and of disappointment;
from whence, after a tedious series of years, they were at length dis-
missed, when their patience and fortune were almost exhausted. 27
Shakespeare penned this line, oft quoted out of context, in the sixteenth
century, "[T]he first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers."' 28 In the 1800s,
Abraham Lincoln spoke of the "vague popular belief that lawyers are neces-
sarily dishonest."' 29 He also believed that this perception of lawyers was
common, almost universal. 30 Nearly a century later, the great American
poet Carl Sandburg wrote:
25. Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 589
(1985) (quoting Plato, Theaetetus, in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 143, 175 (Benjamin Jowett
trans. 1937)).
26. 1 EDWARD GIBBON (1737-1794), THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE,
Chapt. XVII, 533 (Modern Library ed. 1932).
27. Id. at 533-36.
28. William Shakespeare, King Henry the VI, Second Part, Act IV, Scene II, in THE COM-
PLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE 579 (1975). Compare Hoffner, "The First Thing
We Do, We'll Kill All the Lawyers," B. TABS, Feb. 1991, at 3, col. I (positing that Shake-
speare's line, read in context, means that tyranny cannot exist in a free legal system) with
Glenna Whitley, Why We Love to Hate Lawyers, D MAG., May 1991, at 48 ("Never mind the
quote's context - it's the sentiment that's survived .... ").
29. JOHN PAUL FRANK, LINCOLN AS A LAWYER 4 (1961) (quoting 2 THE COLLECTED
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Why is there always a secret singing
When a lawyer cashes in?
Why does a hearse horse snicker
Hauling a lawyer away?3 1
Today, narratives of questionable practices by lawyers persist although the
terminology has been modernized.
B. QUESTIONABLE PRACTICES
1. Sharp Practices
Case law reveals that attorneys have engaged in "sharp practices" or
"sharp dealings" since the early days of American jurisprudence. Although
no real definition for the term can be found, sharp practices are equated with
chicanery and acting in bad faith. 32
An example of a sharp practice is illustrated in a 1973 case involving a
plaintiff's attorney who dismissed a party in a lawsuit to prevent the deposi-
tion of a witness from being taken. 33 This tactic forced a unilateral settle-
ment upon the unsuspecting insurance carrier. 34 The court stated that the
attorney's action was possibly unethical, however, no relief was accorded the
insurance carrier nor were sanctions imposed on the attorney.3 5
Other court denominated sharp practices include lawyers questioning a
witness in a manner suggesting answers to a jury, knowing the witness will
assert the privilege against self-incrimination, lawyers failing to disclose evi-
dence, and lawyers disclosing only half-truths to opposing counsel. 36
2. Gamesmanship, the Sporting Theory of Justice37
As with sharp practices, instances of gamesmanshiphave been recorded
since the early days of American history. Indeed, early judicial proceedings
were characterized as "a battle of wits rather than a search for the truth." 38
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were originated in 1938 to take the
31. Carl Sandburg, The Lawyers Know Too Much, in SMOKE AND STEEL 85 (Harcourt,
Brace & Co. 1920).
32. See Brown v. Royalty, 535 F.2d 1024, 1029 (8th Cir. 1976) (not in good faith); Carsey
v. United States, 392 F.2d 810, 813, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Levanthal, J., concurring) (bad
faith; chicanery).
33. Carter v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 473 F.2d 1071, 1074, 1077-78 (8th Cir. 1973).
34. Id. at 1079.
35. Id.
36. E.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Internal Revenue Serv., 735 F.2d 1277,
1279 (11 th Cir. 1984) (failing to disclose); Brink's, Inc. v. City of New York, 717 F.2d 700, 715
(2d Cir. 1983) (Winter, J., dissenting) (questioning witnesses); United States v. DeMichael, 692
F.2d 1059, 1063 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 907 (1983) (failing to disclose); United
States v. Miranda, 526 F.2d 1319, 1323 n.3 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 821 (1976)
(failing to disclose); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Turner & Newall, P.L.C., 137 F.R.D. 178, 181 (D.
Mass. 1991) (disclosing half-truths).
37. At least one court does not view "typical wrangling and cat-and-mouse
gamesmanship" as objectionable behavior. E.g., In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 103 F.R.D.
130, 148 (D.N.J. 1984).
38. 8 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 2001 (1970).
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"sporting element out of litigation. '39
In Hickman v. Taylor, the Supreme Court of the United States explained:
The pre-trial deposition-discovery mechanism established by Rules 26
to 37 is one of the most significant innovations of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Under the prior federal practice, the pre-trial func-
tions of notice-giving[,] issue-formulation and fact-revelation were per-
formed primarily and inadequately by pleadings. Inquiry into the issues
and the facts before trial was narrowly confined and was often cumber-
some in method .... The various instruments of discovery now serve
(1) as a device, along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 16, to nar-
row and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device
for ascertaining the facts .... Thus civil trials in the federal courts no
longer need be carried on in the dark. The way is now clear... for the
parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts
before trial. 4°
However, these and subsequent innovations in American jurisprudence
have yet to end gamesmanship in litigation.
4 1 The "sporting theory" 42 of
39. Martin v. Reynolds Metals Corp., 297 F.2d 49, 56 (9th Cir. 1961). Prior to the insti-
tution of discovery rules, procedural gamesmanship was characterized, by "lawyers seizing
upon mistakes made by their counterparts in order to gain some advantage." Outley v. City of
New York, 837 F.2d 587, 590 (2d Cir. 1988). In 1941, the Supreme Court of Texas promul-
gated the TexasRules of Civil Procedure under authority of the Rules of Practice Act of 1939.
Nathan L. Hecht, Refining Texas Court Rules: Toward a Faster, Less Expensive, Kinder Gen-
tler Justice System, 8 ADVOC. No. 3a, 3 (1988).
. 40. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1947). Today, nearly fifty years after the
Hickman decision, lawyers and judges define lawyers' uncivil conduct as "strategic non-com-
pliance in discovery, including obstructing access to documents, burdensome requests for doc-
uments, refusals to make reasonable scheduling agreements, one-upmanship, gamesmanship,
sarcasm as a weapon, a failure to cooperate, and winning by trick or at any cost." Interim
Report on Civility, supra note 18, at 386.
41. A recent example was penned by Chief Judge Markey of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit:
Counsel on appeal have each engaged in lamentable attribution of ulterior mo-
tives to the other. Having unprofessionally charged unprofessionalism, each
then cites that charge as warranting an award of costs and attorney fees. Point-
ing to misstatements of the record is appropriate. Motivational analysis is not.
Nor will the latter prejudice the court. Judges have much and many better
things to do than to referee irrelevant cat-fights of counsel.
Glaros v. H.H. Robertson Co., 797 F.2d 1564, 1568 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed, 479
U.S. 1072 (1987); see also Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1373 (6th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976) (stating that a kind of gamesmanship occurs when the in-
fringer, after months of discovery, sparring, and negotiation, agrees to a settlement, then repu-
diates it to start the battle all over).
42. The "sporting theory" of justice "stems from the original function of trials in courts as
substitutes for private wars." In re Barnett, 124 F.2d 1005, 1010 (2d Cir. 1942). American use
of this theory appears to be a carry over from British jurisprudence:
[The game of litigation] is in part the continuance of a tradition, inherited from
the spirit of gentlemanly sportsmanship which dominated the administration of
British justice. But it has been intensified, instead of lessened, by the spirit of
strenuous struggle and unrestrained persistence which drives the bar of our
country to wage their contests to the extreme of technicality.
Id. (quoting JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940)). "The sporting theory of
justice" was criticized in Roscoe Pound's famous address of 1906 prior to the institution of
discovery rules. See Pound, supra note 21, at 404. Pound noted:
The effect of our exaggerated contentious procedure is not only to irritate par-
ties, witnesses and jurors in particular cases, but to give to the whole community
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justice continues to permeate much of the business of the trial courts. 43 A
recent illustration involves a patent dispute in which the defendant obtained
a partial summary judgment ruling that two of the plaintiff's claims were
invalid. 44 The plaintiff prevailed in the trial on the merits on the remaining
claim. 45 Both the plaintiff and the defendant appealed. 46 In the opinion, the
court of appeals noted:
Trial counsel succeeded in creating a muddled procedural puddle in the
trial court, where the parties effectively engaged in two legal contests,
each prevailing in one and losing in the other. Each has then tried on
appeal, in briefs containing mischaracterizations of the law and the
events below, to use the victory in one as a means of converting the loss
to victory in the other.47
Gamesmanship is also said to occur when lawyers forum shop,48 refuse to
examine their own witnesses in depositions to prevent opponents from glean-
ing information, 49 file excessive or unnecessary motions, 50 institute lawsuits
involving identical issues simultaneously in state and federal courts,5' fail to
obey court orders,52 employ tactical delays, 53 file frivolous pleadings and
engage in "recreational" litigation, 54 enter into settlement agreements in bad
faith to strip federal courts of exclusive jurisdiction, 55 and exercise the re-
moval jurisdiction of the federal courts in some cases. 56 Significantly, courts
acknowledge that undue gamesmanship often occurs within the rules of pro-
cedure. 57 Arguably, much of the gamesmanship appears to involve not the
a false notion of the purpose and end of law. Hence comes, in large measure, the
great American race to beat the law. If the law is a mere game, neither the
players who take part in it nor the public who witness it can be expected to yield
to its spirit when their interests are served by evading it.
Id. at 408-09.
43. Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1031, 1033 (1975).
44. Glaros, 797 F.2d at 1566.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1566-67.
47. Glaros, 797 F.2d at 1568.
48. E.g., Nat'l Health Fed'n v. Weinberger, 518 F.2d 711, 714 (7th Cir. 1975); In re Re-
public Reader's Serv., Inc., 81 BR. 422, 428 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1987).
49. Alaska Airlines v. United States, 399 F. Supp. 906, 917 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
50. E.g., Canady v. Koch, 608 F. Supp. 1460, 1473 n.23 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 768 F.2d
501 (2d Cir. 1985); Interim Report on Civility at 388.
51. E.g., LaDuke v. Burlington N. R.R., 879 F.2d 1556, 1560-61 (7th Cir. 1989); Lumen
Constr., Inc. v. Brant Constr. Co., 780 F.2d 691, 693-94 (7th Cir. 1985).
52. E.g., Morton v. Harris, 628 F.2d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 1044 (1981); Casson Constr. Co. v. Armco Steel Corp., 91 F.R.D. 376, 385 (D. Kan.
1980).
53. E.g., Fournier v. Textron, Inc., 776 F.2d 532, 534 (5th Cir. 1985); Factor v. Mall
Airways, Inc., 131 F.R.D. 52, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
54. E.g., S & T Mfg. Co. v. County of Hillsborough, Fla., 815 F.2d 676, 679 (Fed. Cir.
1987); Colt Indus. Operating Corp. v. Index-Werke K.G., 739 F.2d 622, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
Beachboard v. United States, 727 F.2d 1092,. 1095 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
55. E.g., Aro, 531 F.2d at 1371; Sidewinder Marine, Inc. v. Nescher, 440 F. Supp. 680,
682 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
56. E.g., Myers v. Hertz Penske Truck Leasing, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 500, 503 (N.D. Ga.
1983).
57. See, e.g., Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 710 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980) (disapproving delayed exchange of trial briefs in accordance with
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violation of, but rather the strategic use of, court rules.
3. Incivility
Contempt proceedings have been instituted against lawyers for incivilities
since the beginning of American jurisprudence. 58 For example, an attorney
was disbarred in 1883 for conduct unbecoming an attorney when he joined a
mob to remove a prisoner from jail and hang him from an oak tree in front
of the courthouse.5 9 In 1884, a lawyer was held in contempt of court for
threatening the examiner during a deposition with an open knife and using
insulting, indecent language.6° A year later, a federal court remarked that
lawyers entering "the temple of justice" armed with pistols should be found
guilty of contempt of court and disbarred. 61 More recent examples of lawyer
incivilities include threatening 62 or using physical violence on opposing
counsel, 63 advancing personal attacks on opposing counsel in pleadings in-
stead of legal arguments, 64 disparaging jurors, 65 exchanging invectives, 66
and displaying "contentious, abusive, obstructive, scurrilous, and insulting
conduct." '67
In a survey conducted in the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit, over 1500
judges and attorneys commented on civility problems. 68 Civility in litigation
was defined as professional conduct in proceedings involving judicial person-
nel and attorneys. 69 Approximately forty-one percent of those who re-
sponded said that civility problems exist. 70 Rather than citing to the
extreme examples of incivility referenced above, however, the survey attrib-
uted incivility incidents not only to the dramatic increase in practicing law-
yers and economic pressures, but also to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
FED. R. Civ. P. 5(a)); Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997, 1025 (5th Cir. 1979) (remarking that
gamesmanship and "trial by ambush" was within scope of FED. R. CIv. P. 34, but was con-
trary to its spirit). But see Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Hop-On Int'l Corp., 568 F.
Supp. 1568, 1569 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (staying an action for federal declaratory judgment because
plaintiff was manipulating procedures to win the race to the courthouse); Hammond v. Kol-
berg Mfg. Corp., 542 F. Supp. 662, 663 (D. Colo. 1982) (refusing to allow a defendant to
engage in the "futile act" of impleading a party under FED. R. Civ. P. 14 because that party
would immediately be dismissed).
58. As stated in an early Supreme Court case: "[A] court has power to exercise a sum-
mary jurisdiction over its attorneys to compel them to act honestly towards their clients, and
to punish them by fine and imprisonment for misconduct and contempts and, in gross cases of
misconduct, to strike their names from the roll." Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 273 (1883).
59. Id. at 267, 274, 290.
60. United States v. Anonymous, 21 F. 761, 762 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1884).
61. Sharon v. Hill, 24 F. 726, 733-35 (C.C.D. Cal. 1885).
62. Eg., Castillo v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 938 F.2d 776, 779 (7th Cir. 1991).
63. Eg., WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN
AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT 223 (1991) (describing three lawyers involved in a fist
fight during a deposition).
64. E.g., Ross v. County of Lake, 764 F. Supp. 1308, 1311 n.5 (N.D. 11. 1991).
65. Eg., Tanner v. United States, 62 F.2d 601, 602 (10th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S.
746 (1933).
66. E.g., Ross, 764 F. Supp. at 1311 n.5.
67. Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 115 F.R.D. 292, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
68. Interim Report on Civility at 371.
69. Id. The term was not restricted to good manners or social grace. Id.
70. Id.
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Civil Procedure and discovery disputes.7' Judges and lawyers should note:
except for cases involving outright contemptuous behavior, court rules ap-
pear to be at the center of much of the civility problems identified.
4. Hardball Tactics
The "hard-nosed lawyer" employing "hardball tactics" surfaced in case
law in the 1960s.72 Although the terminology is of recent origin, hardball
tactics are similar to the tactics described as gamesmanship and sharp
practices.
"Repeated and abusive hardball tactics" attributed to defendants and
their counsel were recently described by the Fifth Circuit:
For example, the defendants unjustifiably refused to produce docu-
ments in response to discovery, violating an order to compel; they re-
peatedly and falsely denied having applied for and/or having patent
rights in the air snorkel device; they misled the plaintiff about the na-
ture of various documents; and, without any apparent reason, they were
unwilling to state that certain information or claims should be directed
to one Yamaha entity rather than the other. These "obfuscatory de-
fense strategies" and the "gun shot approach to their defense" caused
the district court "at a minimum a waste of conference and trial time,"
and unnecessarily led plaintiff on a "wild goose chase."'73
A federal district court reported "hardball" tactics of a plaintiff's lawyer:
The abuse of the judicial process and the misleading statements and
half-truths made by counsel for plaintiff in briefs and oral arguments,
the baseless allegations directed against this Court, and engaging in
conduct that borders on being unethical, if it is not so, shall never be
condoned or tolerated. 74
It is also said that lawyers use hardball tactics when they use Rule 11 as a
means for intimidation and harassment, 75 file excessive motions for sanc-
tions76 and other pretrial motions,7 7 utilize "obstructionist strategy, ' 78 re-
71. Id.
72. E.g., Federal Maritime Comm'n v. New York Terminal Conference, 373 F.2d 424,
427 (2d Cir. 1967).
73. Sheets v. Yamaha Motors, Corp., U.S.A., 891 F.2d 533, 539-40 (5th Cir. 1990).
74. Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., 135 F.R.D. 139, 151 (M.D. La. 1991).
75. E.g., Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 485 (3d Cir. 1987); In re Express Am.,
132 B.R. 542, 546 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991). "Although Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 has its place, and
there are certainly cases where sanctions are warranted, motions for sanctions have often be-
come simply another weapon in the arsenal of hardball litigators who wish to burden oppo-
nents and the judicial system with every accusation possible." Eldon Indus., Inc. v.
Rubbermaid, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 786, 794 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
76. E.g., Roberts v. Lyons, 131 F.R.D. 75, 82 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Fleet Nat'l Bank v. Ex-
port-Import Bank of the United States, 612 F. Supp. 859, 871 (D.D.C. 1985); Ehret v. New
York City Dep't of Social Servs., 102 F.R.D. 90, 93 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
77. E.g., S.G. Supply Co. v. Greenwood Int'l, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 1430, 1443 (N.D. Ill.
1991); McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 768 F. Supp. 675, 679 (E.D. Wis. 1991); Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 534, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
78. E.g., Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 886 F.2d 1545, 1557 (9th




fuse to extend deadlines for opposing counsel, 79 insist on strict compliance
with the rules,80 and treat discovery as a type of litigation weapon. 8I Here
again, complaints appear to focus on the abusive use of court rules.
82
III. THE RULES OF THE GAME
[Law is] a game which exacts skill, but which, like every game worth
playing, exacts something more important, and that something is the
sportsman's spirit, which is only another word for character. - Benjamin
N Cardozo83
A. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rules of professional conduct have been associated with the practice of
law for many years. The initial rules were adopted by lawyers in the early
history of American jurisprudence to address public concerns over unprofes-
sionalism in the practice of law.84 Alabama was the first state to adopt a
Code of Professional Ethics in the United States in 1887.85 Several other
states adopted professional responsibility codes or canons for lawyers there-
after. 86 In 1908, the American Bar Association adopted the Canons of Pro-
fessional Ethics encouraging lawyers to subscribe to a moral level of conduct
in the practice of law to promote public confidence in the profession. 87 The
early canons were not regulatory in nature, rather they were designed to
legitimize the professional stature of lawyers. 88 Within six years, most of the
states adopted the American Bar Association Code substantially intact. 89 In
1969, the canons were superseded by the Model Code of Professional Re-
79. E.g., First Interstate Bank v. Serv. Stores of Am., 128 F.R.D. 679, 680 (W.D. Okla.
1989).
80. E.g., GFI Computer Indus., Inc. v. Fry, 476 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1973); First Interstate
Bank, 128 F.R.D. at 680.
81. E.g., Frank Music Corp., 886 F.2d at 1557; Koval v. PaineWebber Hous. & Health-
care Funding, Inc., 128 F.R.D. 654, 655 (N.D. I11. 1989).
82. E.g., Stephanie B. Goldberg, Playing Hardball, 73 A.B.A. J. 48 (July 1987) ("Hard-
ball is when a lawyer ... is personally antagonistic or insistent on all of the procedural rules
being followed.").
83. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Game of the Law and its Prizes, reprinted in BENJAMIN N.
CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 160, 168-69 (1931)
(address at the 74th commencement of the Albany Law School, June 10, 1925).
84. HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 23-25 (1953).
85. Id. at 23.
86. Id.
87. See A.B.A. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS PREAMBLE (1908), reprinted in
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 1180-93 app. (West 1986). The Preamble
reflects the purpose for adopting the canons:
In America, where the stability of Courts and of all departments of government
rests upon the approval of the people, it is peculiarly essential that the system
for establishing and dispensing Justice be developed to a high point of efficiency
and so maintained that the public shall have absolute confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of its administration. The future of the Republic, to a great
extent, depends upon our maintenance of Justice pure and unsullied.
Id. at 1180.
88. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.6.2 (West 1986).
89. HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS at 25. Texas adopted the Canons in 1909. Cul-
len C. Smith, The Texas Canons of Ethics Revisited, 18 BAYLOR L. REV. 183, 183 (1966).
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sponsibility, which is partially mandatory and partially aspirational in
nature.90
Since 1983, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct have represented the
American Bar Association's three-prong approach to the ethical practice of
law.9 1 First, some of the Model Rules are mandatory in nature and deline-
ate minimum standards of conduct that if violated, may subject the errant
lawyer to disciplinary action. 92 Second, other rules depict areas of lawyer
conduct in which violations are not sanctionable in a disciplinary sense.9 3
Third, several Model Rules suggest behavioral standards cast in terms of "a
lawyer should" rather than "shall."' 94 Today's Model Rules, for the most
part, are legally binding with the use of sanctions including disbarment and
suspension. 95 Perhaps changes in the legal profession warrant these changes
in the ethical rules. 96
For nearly two centuries, despite formalistic changes, the ethical rules
have remained substantively the same. 97 As in 1908, the rules focus on the
lawyer's duties of: (1) loyalty to the client; (2) confidentiality; and (3) can-
dor to the court. 98 The obligations of loyalty and confidentiality legitimize
client representation, while the obligation of candor to the court legitimizes
lawyers' affiliation with the judiciary.99 The resulting conflict of fidelities
between the client and the courts is an unhappy by-product of the adversary
90. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969), reprinted in CHARLES
W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 1021-94 (1986) (Model Code is comprised of Canons,
Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules). Texas adopted the Texas Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility in 1971 consisting of Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary
Rules. See SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1971).
91. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983), reprinted in CHARLES W.
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 1095-1169 app. (West 1986). Texas adopted Discipli-
nary Rules of Professional Conduct in 1990 relying on the American Bar Association Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, codes and rules of sister state bar associations, and recent
literature on legal ethics. See SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, STATE BAR RULES art. X, § 9(Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure); James B. Sales, The Texas Disciplinary Rules of Pro-fessional Conduct: A Model to Replace the Outdated Texas Code of Professional Responsibility,
52 TEX. B.J. 388, 390 (Apr. 1989).
92. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.6.4 (West 1986).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1251 (1991).
96. As noted by Geoffrey Hazard, Law Professor at Yale Law School and Reporter for
the Model Rules Commission, in an analysis of the American Bar Association's canons, codes,
and rules:
[The legal profession's Model Rules] no longer represent the shared understand-
ings of a substantially cohesive group. They are simply rules of public law regu-
lating a widely pursued technical vocation .... "Legalized" regulation will
undoubtedly continue to dominate the normative structure of the legal profes-
sion, through court-promulgated rules, increasingly intrusive common law, and
public statutes and regulations. As a consequence, the dominate normative in-
stitution for the legal profession will no longer be "the bar," meaning the profes-
sion as a substantially inclusive fraternal group. The bar has become too large,
diverse, and balkanized in its practice specialties for the old informal system to
be effective as an institution of governance.
Hazard, supra note 95, at 1279.





system;'°0 a system based upon the premise that the truth will emerge from
competitive presentations of factual and legal considerations. 10 The evolve-
ment of the rules of conduct from aspirational to mandatory is not without
criticism. 10 2
B. THE LAWYER AS ADVOCATE AND OFFICER OF THE COURT
Lawyers should be encouraged to behave in a manner that zealously
guards the interests of the client but does not countenance obstruction of the
legal process. Harvard Professor Alan Dershowitz asserts that lawyers must
be aggressive on behalf of clients and must "go right up to the line of zealous
advocacy. ''103 What about the lawyer as officer of the court? The conflict-
ing duties to the client and the court created by rules of ethics manifest
themselves through the lawyer's obligation to act as an advocate and, at the
same time, behave as an officer of the court. 10 4 This latter duty, believed to
be a carryover from English courts, 10 5 was described by Chief Justice Benja-
min Cardozo over sixty years ago: "Membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. [A member of the bar becomes] an officer of the
court, and, like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends
of justice."' 10 6 Cardozo explained that the duty of acting as an officer of the
court requires a lawyer's cooperation whenever injustice would occur if co-
100. Rhode, supra note 25, at 595.
101. Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1031, 1036 (1975).
102. See Rhode, supra note 25, at 600-01 (1985). Rules of professional conduct are criti-
cized as ineffective in curbing abusive litigation practices. See, e.g., Ricardo G. Cedillo &
David Lopez, Document Destruction in Business Litigation from a Practitioner's Point-of- View:
The Ethical Rules vs. Practical Realities, 20 ST. MARY'S L.J. 637, 640 (1989) (ethical rules do
not effectively deter evidence destruction); Rhode, supra note 25, at 601 (rules of ethics allow
lawyers to present false or misleading evidence, and to counsel clients to refrain from volun-
tary disclosures); Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L.
REV. 639, 645 (1981) (Model Rules are ineffective as an instrument to promote ethical behav-
ior). But see Stephen M. Bundy & Einer R. Elhauge, Do Lawyers Improve the Adversary Sys-
tem? A General Theory of Litigation Advice and Its Regulation, 79 CAL. L. REV. 313, 354-57
(1991) (rules of ethics have positive effect by causing some lawyers to counter clients' interests
to allow unfavorable information to reach the tribunal). Professor Deborah Rhode of Stanford
Law School remarks that the rules of ethics, by stressing the lawyer's duty to the client, relieve
lawyers "of any responsibility for substantive justice" and of any duty to glean fair or rational
results. Rhode, supra note 25, at 604. But see E. Wayne Thode, The Ethical Standard for the
Advocate, 39 TEX. L. REV. 575, 591 (1961) (commenting that rules of ethics interfere with the
advocate's obligations to clients). Professor Thode suggests that ethical standards should be
amended to include the pledge: "I will always maintain an attitude of respect toward the
court, but respect does not imply subservience. I am obligated to represent my client fully
before the court, and a subservient attitude could be incompatible with such obligation." Id. at
592.
103. Stephanie B. Goldberg, Playing Hardball, 73 A.B.A. J. 48, 52 (July 1987).
104. See Roberts v. Lyons, 131 F.R.D. 75, 82 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (quoting Pioneer Liemel
Fabrics, Inc. v. Paul Rothman Indus., Ltd., No. 87-2581, slip op., 1988 WL 36343 (E.D. Pa.
April 18, 1988)) (lawyer's duty as an officer of the court conflicts with zealous advocacy
requirement).
105. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 1.6 (West 1986); Eugene R.
Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 42 (1989).
106. Karlin v. Culkin, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (N.Y. 1928) (citations omitted).
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operation is withheld. 107
The Supreme Court of the United States frequently refers to the lawyer's
duty as an officer of the court, 10 8 and explains that this duty is defined by
case law, court rules, and "the lore of the profession," as established in the
attorney's home state rules of professional conduct. 109 For example, Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Procedure requires that a lawyer's duty to clients
cannot override his or her obligation to the justice system. °10 This obliga-
tion is further defined by the Second Circuit: "The quality of Justice de-
pends upon our ability to control the flood of litigation. Rule 11 requires
that members of the bar avoid haphazard, superficial research. That require-
ment places the responsibility for properly invoking the power of the court
on counsel as officers of the court." 1'
In many instances, the duty to behave as an officer of the court is said to
equal or outweigh the duty to the client. Case law has dictated that "[a]n
attorney owes his first duty to the court."'"l 2 The preamble to the Model
Rules begins by stating that a lawyer represents clients, acts as an officer of
the legal system, and maintains a special responsibility to justice as a public
citizen."l 3 The Dallas Bar Association Guidelines of Professional Courtesy,
the inspiration of many other bar association civility codes, begins by stating
107. Id. More recently a federal district court echoed Cardozo's sentiments that practicing
law is an honor and privilege, but stated that as officers of the court, attorneys have a duty to
show dignity and respect for the court and the administration of justice. Our Lady of the Lake
Hosp., 135 F.R.D. at 156.
108. See, e.g., Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., Inc., 498 U.S.
533, 564 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Superior Court Trial
Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 453 (1990) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part);
In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 644 (1985); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 460
(1978); In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 668 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Theard v. United
States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). The Texas
Supreme Court and Texas Court of Criminal Appeals also assert that lawyers are officers of the
court. E.g., Exparte Rose, 704 S.W.2d 751, 754 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Dow Chem. Co.
v. Benton, 357 S.W.2d 565, 567 (Tex. 1962); Martinez v. State, 318 S.W.2d 66, 71 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1958); In re Laughlin, 265 S.W.2d 805, 808 (Tex. 1954), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 859
(1954); Ex parte Norton, 191 S.W.2d 713, 716 (Tex. 1946).
109. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. at 645.
110. In re Ronco, Inc., 105 F.R.D. 493, 497 (N.D. I11. 1985), appeal dismissed, 793 F.2d
1295 (7th Cir. 1986).
111. International Shipping Co. v. Hydra Offshore, Inc., 875 F.2d 388, 393 (2d Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1003 (1989).
112. In re Integration of Neb. State Bar Ass'n, 275 N.W. 265, 268 (Neb. 1937). The court,
noting that attorneys obligate themselves to the courts before ever obtaining clients, stated that
"lawyers cannot serve two masters; and the one they have undertaken to serve primarily is the
court." Id.
113. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983), reprinted in CHARLES W.
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 1097 (West 1986). The preamble to the Model Rules
asserts an optimistic viewpoint on these responsibilities: "A lawyer's responsibilities as a rep-
resentative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen are usually harmonious.
Thus, when an opposing party is well represented, a lawyer can be a zealous advocate on
behalf of a client and at the same time assume that justice is being done." Id. at 1098. Inter-
estingly, the Texas State Bar Rules preamble, fashioned from the Model Rules, omits this
language. See SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, STATE BAR RULES art. X, § 9 (Texas Rules of
Disciplinary Procedure) Preamble, reprinted in TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. (Vernon Supp. 1991).
The preamble of the Texas State BAr Rules does point out the three roles of the lawyer in the
same manner as the Model Rules. Id.
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that the lawyer's duty is primarily to the client, yet insists that "a lawyer
must be ever conscious of the broader duty to the judicial system that serves
both attorney and client."' 14 As with rules of conduct, the notion of the
attorney as an officer of the curt has also been criticized. 1 5
C. RULES INTENDED TO STOP "RAMBO"
1. Rule 37(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 37(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' 16 is a good illustration
of a procedural rule designed to curb Rambo tactics used in the discovery
114. DALLAS BAR ASS'N GUIDELINES OF PROF. COURTESY (1987) (emphasis added).
115. Gaetke, supra note 105, at 44 (1989).
116. Rule 37(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [hereinafter Rule 37(b)] provides
in part:
(b)(2) Sanctions by Court in Which Action is Pending. If a party or an officer,
director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule
30(b)(6) or 3 1(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide
or permit discovery .... the court in which the action is pending may make such
orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others the following:
(A) An order that the matters regarding which the order was made or any
other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the
action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
(B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose
designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting that party from introducing desig-
nated matters in evidence;
(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further pro-
ceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any
part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party;
(D) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order
treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders except an order to
submit to a physical or mental examination;
(E) Where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule 35(a) re-
quiring that party to produce another for examination, such orders as are listed
in paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision, unless the party failing to
comply shows that the party is unable to produce such person for examination.
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court shall
require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising that party or
both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the
failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that
other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b) (emphasis added).
The Texas counterpart of Rule 37(b) is Rule 215 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
(hereinafter Texas Rule 215) which provides in part:
2.b. Sanctions by Court in Which Action is Pending. If a party or an officer,
director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated.., fails to comply
with proper discovery requests or to obey an order to provide or permit discov-
ery .... the court ... may, after notice and hearing, make such orders in regard
to the failure as are just, and among others the following:
(1) An order disallowing any further discovery of any kind or of a particular
kind by the disobedient party;
(2) An order charging all or any portion of the expenses of discovery or taxa-
ble court costs or both against the disobedient party or the attorney advising
him;
(3) An order that the matters regarding which the order was made or any
other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the
action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
(4) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose
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context,"I7 but which often is the catalyst for Rambo activity. The Special
Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse of the American Bar Associa-
tion's Section of Litigation delineates discovery abuse as misuse and
overuse. 118 As summarized by one commentator, "[d]iscovery and motions
practice provide a near inexhaustible repertoire of ways for litigants to tease,
worry, irk, goad, pester, trouble, rag, torment, pique, molest, bother, vex,
nettle, and annoy each other." ' 19 Although abusive and excessive discovery
practices are attributed to a "leave no stone upturned" attitude, assigning
discovery issues to overly zealous junior lawyers, and the desire to bill more
hours, 120 often, overuse of discovery simply involves the exploitation of legit-
designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated
matters in evidence;
(5) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further pro-
ceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing with or without prejudice the
action or proceedings or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default
against the disobedient party;
(6) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order
treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders except an order to
submit to a physical or mental examination;
(7) When a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule 167a(a)
requiring him to appear or produce another for examination, such orders as are
listed in paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (4) or (5) of this subdivision, unless the person
failing to comply shows that he is unable to appear or to produce such person
for examination.
(8) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court
shall require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising him, or
both, to pay, at such time as ordered by the court, the reasonable expenses,
including attorney fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the
failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of
expenses unjust. Such an order shall be subject to review on appeal from the
final judgment.
5. Failure to Respond to or Supplement Discovery. A party who fails to re-
spond to or supplement his response to a request for discovery shall not be enti-
tled to present evidence which the party was under a duty to provide in a
response or supplemental response or to offer the testimony of an expert witness
or of any other person having knowledge of discoverable matter, unless the trial
court finds that good cause sufficient to require admission exists. The burden of
establishing good cause is upon the party offering the evidence and good cause
must be shown in the record.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(2)(b) and (5) (emphasis added). Compare FED. R. CIv. P. 37(b) (permis-
sive sanctions) with TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(2)(b) (permissive) and TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(5)
(mandatory).
117. The policies for Rule 37 reflect a desire for "complete and fair adjudication of a case's
merits" and a concern that law suits were becoming more like contests instead of a search for
the truth. William R. Mureiko, Note, The Agency Theory of the Attorney-Client Relationship:
An Improper Justification for Holding Clients Responsible for their Attorneys' Procedural Er-
rors, 1988 DUKE L.J. 733, 746. For a summary of other federal sanction provisions see J. D.
Page & Doug Sigel, The Inherent and Express Powers of Courts to Sanction, 31 S. TEX. L.J. 43,
51-61 (1990) (discussing 26 U.S.C. §§ 6673 and 7482(c)(4); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1447(c), 1912, and
1927; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988 and 2000e-5(k); FED. R. CIv. P. 11, 16(0, 26(g), 37, 45(0, and 56(g);
and FED. R. APP. P. 38 and 46).
118. Weyman I. Lundquist & Frank F. Flegal, Discovery Abuse - Some New Views About
an Old Problem, 2 REV. LITIG. 1, 1 (1981).
119. WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN
AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT 229 (1991).
120. Report of the Advisory Group of the United States District Court for the Eastern
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imate methods to burden or harass the opposing party.121
Rule 37(b) was substantially amended in 1970 to encourage more frequent
imposition of sanctions for discovery abuses.1 22 However, Rule 37(b) and
the states' counterparts to Rule 37(b) continue to be criticized for falling far
short of restraining Rambo tactics and, notably, even encouraging such
tactics. 123
District of Pennsylvania Appointed under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 138 F.R.D.
167, 234 (1991).
121. Lundquist & Flegal, supra note 118, at 5. Such tactics are often employed by liti-
gators "to induce settlement for nuisance value or to make continuation of the lawsuit infeasi-
ble or impossible." William W. Kilgarlin & Don Jackson, Sanctions for Discovery Abuse Under
New Rule 215, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 767, 770 (1984).
122. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 38, § 2281; see also Advisory Committee Note to
1970 Amendments of Rule 37, 48 F.R.D. 487, 538 (1969) (1970 amendments were designed to
rectify defects in the rule's language and to promote its purpose of sanctioning those unjustifi-
ably resisting discovery). Texas Rule 215 was substantially renovated in 1984 to discourage
discovery abuses. Kilgarlin & Jackson, supra note 121, at 770. The text of Rule 215 "evinces
its potential to be forcefully used to advance the goal of substantive justice administered inex-
pensively with expedition and dispatch." Id. at 775. This goal was to be furthered by giving
trial judges more flexibility and authority to impose sanctions on aberrant attorneys and par-
ties in the discovery context. Id. A major change in Rule 215 allows Texas lawyers to apply
for sanctions without first seeking a court order compelling discovery. William W. Kilgarlin,
Sanctions for Discovery Abuse: Is the Cure Worse than the Disease?, 54 TEX. B.J. 658, 658
(1991). In federal practice, a court order is required. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2).
123. A criticism of Rule 37(b) is that it offers an automatic second chance for parties re-
sisting discovery because the judge must first order the recusant party to obey a discovery
request before sanctions can be imposed. Note, The Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the
Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1037 (1978). Often, the judge will
supply even a third chance to the aberrant party by delaying the ultimate sanction unless
further noncompliance occurs. Id; see Morton v. Harris, 628 F.2d 438, 438-40 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1044 (1981) (imposing sanctions after four court orders were obtained in
an attempt to obtain tax records in discovery). Other criticisms involve the wide judicial dis-
cretion afforded in Rule 37(b)'s application and the possibility of constitutional violations
when Rule 37(b) is invoked solely for deterrence purposes. The Emerging Deterrence Orienta-
tion in the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, supra at 1055. The Supreme Court of the United
States explained: "[T]here are constitutional limitations upon the power of courts, even in aid
of their own valid processes, to dismiss an action without affording a party the opportunity for
a hearing on the merits of his cause." Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 209-10
(1958); see also Transamerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 918 (Tex. 1991)
(discussing constitutional limits on rendering a default judgment based upon discovery
abuses). Still another criticism of Rule 37(b) is that it is ineffective in the control of excessive
and burdensome discovery abuses. Edna S. Epstein et al., An Up-Date on Rule 37 Sanctions
After National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Clubs, Inc., 84 F.R.D. 145, 171
(1980).
Texas Rule 215 is blamed for causing both paper wars and the rampant spread of Rambo
litigation practices in Texas. David W. Holman & Byron C. Keeling, Disclosure of Witnesses
in Texas: The Evolution and Application of Rules 166b(6) and 215(5) of the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure, 42 BAYLOR L. REV. 405, 447 (1990). One of Rule 215's strongest proponents,
former Texas Supreme Court Justice Kilgarlin, now concedes that the amended rule has not
curbed abusive discovery practices. Kilgarlin, supra note 122, at 658. He explains:
Lawyers now, rather than taking the time to talk to their adversaries and learn
how much additional time will be required to obtain discovery responses, turn
immediately to the courts with requests that the most awesome of sanctions
powers be invoked. Aided by memory typewriters and other improved forms of
advanced technology, lawyers sit back and lob motion after motion against their
opponents as if they were firing the 16" guns of the USS. Missouri at some
Iraqi stronghold.
Id. Kilgarlin advocates changes in Rule 215 to address the availability of mandamus for re-
view of sanctions, the clarification of the standard for reviewing court ordered sanctions, and
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2. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Another illustration is Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,124
which requires federal courts to sanction lawyers and clients in order to de-
ter the Rambo tactic of filing frivolous lawsuits.1 25 Rule 11 was amended in
the addition of a requirement that extreme sanctions be imposed only after a prior order is
entered compelling discovery. Id. at 664-65. Other suggested changes include the clarification
of terms, the implementation of certain factors in "good cause" analysis, and a requirement
that communication between attorneys transpire before the sanction of exclusion of witness'
testimony is imposed. Holman & Keeling, supra, at 449-57.
124. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [hereinafter "Rule 11"] provides in
pertinent part:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that
the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the
signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or
other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after
the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading,
motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion
or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a repre-
sented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to
pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred
because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reason-
able attorney's fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (emphasis added).
The Texas counterpart to Rule 11, Rule 13 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure [hereinaf-
ter "Texas Rule 13"], provides:
The signatures of attorneys or parties constitute a certificate by them that
they have read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of their
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry the instru-
ment is not groundless and brought in bad faith or groundless and brought for
the purpose of harassment. Attorneys or parties who shall bring a fictitious suit
as an experiment to get an opinion of the court, or who shall file any fictitious
pleading in a cause for such a purpose, or shall make statements in pleading
which they know to be groundless and false, for the purpose of securing a delay
of the trial of the cause, shall be held guilty of a contempt. If a pleading, motion
or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon
its own initiative, after notice and hearing, shall impose an appropriate sanction
available under Rule 215-2b, upon the person who signed it, a represented party,
or both.
Courts shall presume that pleadings, motions, and other papers are filed in
good faith. No sanctions under this rule may be imposed except for good cause,
the particulars of which must be stated in the sanction order. "Groundless" for
purposes of this rule means no basis in law or fact and not warranted by good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. A
general denial does not constitute a violation of this rule. The amount requested
for damages does not constitute a violation of this rule.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 13 (emphasis added); see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(2)(b) supra note 122. Texas
Rule 215 became effective January 1, 1988. William W. Kilgarlin et al., Practicing Law in the
"New Age'" The 1988 Amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, 19 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 881, 882 (1988); Anthony Benedetto & David Keltner, Changes in Pleading Practices(Including the Frivolous Suit Question), ST. MARY'S NINTH ANNUAL PROCEDURAL INSTI-
TUTE: CIVIL PROCEDURE 1988 - RULES AND STATUTORY CHANGES F-3 (1987).
125. See Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533,
534 (1991) (finding that the purpose of Rule 11 is "to deter baseless filings and curb abuses");
see also Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 411 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part) ("Rule 11 is designed to deter parties from abusing judicial re-
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1983 because the then existing Rule 11 was only reluctantly imposed on a
voluntary basis. 126 The stated purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to "discour-
age dilatory or abusive tactics and help to streamline the litigation process
by lessening frivolous claims or defenses."' 127
Rule 11 creates a certification of "every pleading, motion, and other pa-
per" signed by an attorney or party. 128 The certification calls for sanctions
unless, to the best of the attorney's knowledge, information and belief
formed after reasonable inquiry, the document is well grounded in fact and
is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for an
improper purpose, such as to harass or cause needless delay or increase in
litigation costs.' 29 Interestingly, these requirements already exist in rules of
ethics and in the lawyer's duty to act as an officer of the court.1 30
sources .. "). Texas Rule 13 was adopted because the Texas Supreme Court felt that baseless
lawsuits were inadequately dealt with by existing laws and ethical provisions. John T.
Montford & Will G. Barber, 1987 Texas Tort Reform: The Quest for a Fairer and More Pre-
dictable Texas Civil Justice System, 25 Hous. L. REV. 245, 344 (1988).
126. Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 869-70 (5th Cir. 1988); see also
Jeffrey N. Cole, Rule 11 Now, 17 LITIG. 10, 10 (Spring 1991) (stating that sanctions under pre-
1983 Rule 11 required subjective showing of bad faith and were seldom imposed). For a sy-
nopsis of the differences between current Rule 11 and the pre-1983 Rule 11 see 5A CHARLES
A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1331 (1990).
Due to complaints that it was ineffective, Texas Rule 13 was amended in 1990 to eliminate the
90-day grace period that was previously allowed for an offending party to either withdraw or
amend pleadings to satisfy the court. TEX. R. Civ. P. 13 cmt.; see also Ernest E. Figari, Jr. et
al., Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 73, 81-82 (1991) (discussing
changes in Texas Rule 13).
Amended Texas Rule 13 differs from Federal Rule 11 in five respects. First, Texas Rule 13,
unlike Rule 11, provides that sanctions be imposed only when good cause is shown after over-
coming the presumption of a good faith filing. Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 13 (requiring good
cause) with FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (silent on good cause). Second, Federal Rule 11 sanctions are
mandatory while Texas Rule 13 sanctions are permissive in that they need not be imposed
unless good cause exists. Compare TEX, R. Civ. P. 13 (requiring good cause) with FED. R.
CIv. P. I 1 (silent on good cause). Third, Texas Rule 13 requires notice and hearing as a
prerequisite for sanctions while its federal counterpart does not. Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 13
(requiring notice and hearing) with FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (silent) and Oliveri v. Thompson, 803
F.2d 1265, 1280 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that although evidentiary hearing is not required,
notice and opportunity to be heard are required before imposing Rule 1 sanctions), cert. de-
nied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987). Fourth, Federal Rule I1 provides for sanctions on a finding that a
party has filed a "groundless" pleading while Texas Rule 13 allows sanctions if pleadings are
groundless and something more. Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 13 (requiring groundless and
brought in bad faith or groundless and brought for harassment) with FED. R. CIv. P. 11 (re-
quiring "groundless" alone). Fifth, Texas Rule 13, unlike Rule 11, does not apply to a general
denial or to amounts requested for damages. Compare TEX. R. Civ. P. 13 (addressing general
denial and requests for damages) with FED. R. Civ. P. I 1 (silent).
127. Advisory Committee Note on the 1983 Amendments, 97 F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983).
Factors considered by the Advisory Committee in drafting the 1983 amendments included: (1)
the economic incentives to litigate; (2) the expansion of federal substantive rights; (3) the in-
creased size in the bar; and (4) the easy access to federal courts. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
note 126, at 13.
128. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
129. Id.
130. William W. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11 - A Closer Look,
104 F.R.D. 181, 189-90 (1985). Model Rule 3.1 provides, in part: "A lawyer shall not bring
or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing
so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or
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Despite the lofty intentions behind it, Rule 11 is the butt of severe criti-
cism. 131 Rule 11 is criticized on the grounds "that it generates wasteful 'sat-
ellite' litigation; chills both creativity and opposition to the status quo; and
poisons the relationship between opposing counsel."' 132 Other criticisms of
Rule 11 include: its unpredictable application; the possibility of over-vigor-
ous enforcement depriving parties and attorneys of their due process rights;
its dubious necessity in light of existing statutes, ethical rules and the inher-
ent power of courts to police conduct; and the impropriety of utilizing .proce-
dural rules to improve the quality of lawyering. 133
In practice, studies show that Rule 11 is invoked almost exclusively by
lawyers and not by judges, although judges have the authority to do so.134
Litigators report that the main reason they request Rule 11 sanctions is to
obtain the best possible result for clients - to win the lawsuit on the mer-
its.135 Arguably, Rule 11 is used to curb "not frivolous arguments, but dan-
gerous arguments."' 136
3. Local Rules
As with Rules 37(b) and 11, which were designed for one purpose, but
criticized for their contribution to Rambo's armament, local rules of court,
which were designed to bring efficiencies to local court practice, are similarly
criticized. Rule 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows district
courts to make and amend local rules governing their practice, so long as the
reversal of existing law." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1983); see
also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A) (1969). There is some
debate as to whether the duty of candor to the tribunal expressed in Model Rule 3.3 is impli-
cated by Rule 11. Mallen, Judicial Sanctions, reprinted in THE DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTI-
TUTE, A SPECIAL PUBLICATION 9-10 (1991).
131. One commentator stated after a review of Rule 11 case law: "The rule was amended
to give judges a more focused standard for imposing sanctions, not carte blanche to reform the
adversary system." Melissa C. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11 - Some
"Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J.
1313, 1353 (1986).
132. Mark S. Stein, Rule 11 in the Real World: How the Dynamics of Litigation Defeat the
Purpose of Imposing Attorney Fee Sanctions for the Assertion of Frivolous Legal Arguments, 132
F.R.D. 309, 309-10 (1991); Alex Elson & Edwin A. Rothschild, Rule 11: Objectivity and Com-
petence, 123 F.R.D. 361, 365-66 (1989); see also Don J. DeBenedictis, Rule 11 Snags Lawyers;
Critics Charge Rulings Will Discourage Civil-Rights Cases, 77 A.B.A. J. 16, 16 (Jan. 1991)
(stating that some critics claim that Rule 11 is a means to punish plaintiffs who file unpopular
causes of action). But see Michael A. Mack, Rule 11 - Myth v. Reality, 33 FOR THE DEF. 2, 8
(Apr. 1991) ("[A]ssertions that Rule 11 will have far-reaching negative consequences for the
practice of law appear to be unfounded."); Julian A. Cook, Rule 11: A Judicial Approach to an
Effective Administration of Justice in the United States Courts, 15 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 397, 397-
526 (1988) (conducting extensive evaluation of the federal judiciary implementation of Rule II
and concluding that concerns over Rule 11 could be allayed by reasonable application stan-
dards); Goldberg, supra note 82, at 49 (Dean of Chicago's plaintiffs' bar comments that
amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure increase the tendency of federal courts to
sanction and are effective deterrents).
133. 5A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 1332 (1990).
134. Stein, supra note 132, at 311.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 312.
1994]
SMU LAW REVIEW
local rules are consistent with the federal scheme.' 37 Although creation of
local rules under Rule 83 was expected only on rare occasions where the
civil rules left gaps to be filled, the resultant proliferation of local rules is
claimed to be responsible for "clogging the federal scheme and setting traps
for the unwary."' 38 Not only does each federal district court have a set of
local rules, each judge has individual procedural rules to be followed in his
or her court.' 39 Local rules are also prevalent in state court systems.'
40
And, local rules are used as an independent means to sanction attorney
misconduct. 14'
Reasons for the proliferation of local rules include: (1) the dramatic rise
in lawsuits; (2) the increase of complex cases; (3) the vast documentation in
discovery; (3) the increase in new lawyers; (4) the increase in court person-
nel; and (4) the need to manage dockets and routinize operations. 42
"[Plerhaps the most frequently violated local rules deal simply with filing
and preparation of motion papers."' 143 Significantly, when a lawyer files a
motion asking for dismissal of a complaint, the failure to oppose the motion
in conformity with local rules may have the disastrous consequence of dis-
missal of the lawsuit. 144 It is of little wonder that local rules are implicated
in Rambo litigation practices. 145
4. Civility Codes
Bar associations began to adopt civility codes in the late 1980's as a fur-
ther attempt to restrain excess litigation and encourage cooperation between
opposing counsel.146 Although rules of ethics and procedural rules also ad-
137. FED. R. Civ. P. 83. The corresponding Texas provisions are Rule 3a of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. TEX. R. Civ.
P. 3a; TEX. R. App. P. l(b).
138. Tiedel v. Northwestern Mich. College, 865 F.2d 88, 91 (6th Cir. 1988).
139. Cindy R. Weir, Order in the Court: Rules of Federal District Courts in Texas, 54 TEX.
B.J. 610, 610 (June 1991).
140. See, e.g., Local Rules of Appellate Procedure for the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
District of Texas at Dallas (1992); Dallas Civil District Court Rules (1993).
141. Roberts v. Lyons, 131 F.R.D. 75, 79 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
142. Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules. Uniformity, Diver-
gence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2018-19 (1989).
143. James J. Duane, Local Rules in Ambush, 17 LITIG. 33, 34 (Spring 1991).
144. See, e.g., Black Unity League of Kentucky v. Miller, 394 U.S. 100, 100-01 (1969) (per
curiam) (after plaintiffs failed to respond to defendants' motion to dismiss, therefore violating a
local court rule, court properly granted defendant's motion); Tingle v. Parke, 894 F.2d 408,
408 (6th Cir. 1990) (court properly dismissed complaint with prejudice for failure to file an
opposing memorandum to defendants' motion to dismiss in accordance with a local rule);
Woodham v. American Cystoscope Co., 335 F.2d 551, 552 (5th Cir. 1964) (district court dis-
missed complaint after the plaintiff failed to comply with local rules); Burkett v. Zablocki, 54
F.R.D. 626, 626 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (after plaintiffs failed to submit a response brief to defend-
ant's brief, in accordance with local rules, defendant's motion to dismiss was granted).
145. Professor Subrin of the Northeastern University School of Law observes that local
rules are often manipulated by ingenious lawyers in order to benefit clients. Subrin, supra note
142, at 2051. To quell such manipulation, Professor Subrin seeks the institution of uniform
procedural rules. Id. at 2000. Texas has a rules project underway cataloguing rules under
subject headings, denoting the various versions of the local rules. Hecht, supra note 39, at 6.
146. See The Texas Lawyer's Creed - A Mandate for Professionalism, in TEXAS RULES OF
COURT (1993); Dallas Bar Ass'n Guidelines of Professional Courtesy (1987); see also Brewer &
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dress these issues, the utilization of civility codes reflects the legal profes-
sion's belief that current rules are neither sufficiently observed nor effectively
enforced.147 The Dallas Bar Association Guidelines of Professional Cour-
tesy appears in the Appendix as an example of a civility code.
Unlike ethical and procedural rules, civility codes are usually considered
aspirational in nature. The Texas Lawyer's Creed illustrates the voluntary
nature of civility codes: "These rules are primarily aspirational. Compli-
ance with the rules depends primarily upon understanding and voluntary
compliance, secondarily upon reenforcement by peer pressure and .public
opinion, and finally when necessary by enforcement by the courts through
their inherent powers and rules already in existence."' 148 Yet, civility codes
are doomed to generate satellite litigation and add to Rambo's arsenal. 149
Civility codes have been criticized for having no beneficial effect on trial
dockets, but rather harming the legal profession by diverting attention from
the merits of a case and by threatening zealous advocacy. 150
D. RULES - WHO GETS BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT?
Common to these rules of the game is the burden they place on counsel to
evaluate the client's case from an objective standard. The more stringent the
rules, the greater the likelihood that counsel will face conflicting require-
ments of strategically advocating on behalf of the client while at the same
time giving opposing counsel the benefit of the doubt. In an adversary sys-
tem, rules drafted to allow each side to force the other to produce informa-
tion coupled with emphatic rules to cooperate, invariably oblige counsel to
make decisions against the client's interest. If the claim is arguably justifi-
able, it is also arguably frivolous. If the information sought is arguably rele-
vant, it is also arguably objectionable. Under the historical approach to rule
making, functional problems in the administration of justice are bound to
compound.
IV. BEGINNING AGAIN
Few rules in our time are so well established that they may not be called
upon any day to justify their existence as means adapted to an end. -
Benjamin N. Cardozo '5 '
Majorie, supra note 19, at 844 (including as reasons for adopting civility codes the desire to
decrease litigation costs and crowded dockets as reasons for adopting civility codes); Geoffrey
C. Hazard, Jr., Civility Code May Lead to Less Civility, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 26, 1990, at 13 (stat-
ing that civility codes are adopted "to curb the abusive language, abusive tactics and abusive
process that many lawyers think demonstrate zeal and competence").
147. Hazard, supra note 146, at 14.
148. The Texas Lawyer's Creed, supra note 146.
149. See Hazard, supra note 146, at 13 (stating that Texas can expect satellite litigation to
determine whether the creed is meant to authoritatively interpret current disciplinary rules).
Monroe Freedman, Hofstra University Professor of Legal Ethics, further states that civility
codes conflict with disciplinary rules and should not be adopted by courts. Monroe Freedman,
In the Matter of Manners: Misjudgments on Courtesy, TEX. LAW., Mar. 18, 1991, at 34.
150. Brewer & Majorie, supra note 18, at 846-50.
151. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 98 (1921).
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Concerns regarding manipulative litigation practices (especially discovery
abuses) spawned the amendment and increased use of Rule 37 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in the 1970s.1 52 Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure was substantially revised in 1983 to impose mandatory sanc-
tions against attorneys or parties who assert frivolous legal arguments. 153
Not only were rules and statutes enacted or amended across the country to
curb perceived abuses, but courts exercised their inherent powers to sanction
conduct not specifically addressed by the rules.' 54 Local rules and civility
codes were also adopted to keep lawyers in line. The courts and the organ-
ized bar have deluged the system with these new rules to curb the vices of
the profession. Yet, today's popular literature continues to reflect ancient
sentiments that the legal profession is rank with questionable practices. The
New York Times recently pointed out: "[M]any young persons entering law
adopted the belief that lawyers were supposed to be rich and, lately, extrava-
gantly rich.... Their relentless pursuit of money (and perhaps pressure put
on them by partners) has virtually destroyed their ability to develop friend-
ships with opposing lawyers."' 55 A popular Dallas magazine described pub-
lic discontent over "fear tactics ... and absurd legalese."' 5 6 The results of a
national survey reveal that only twenty-seven percent of United States citi-
zens believe that lawyers would not lie to juries. 157 All the while, legal com-
mentators are far from unanimous as to whether lawyer misconduct (and
judicial misconduct, for that matter) is more prevalent today than in years
past.' 5 8 Is there a better way? If questionable practices by lawyers are more
152. Note, The Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions,
91 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 1033-34 (1978). In 1984, Texas revised Rule 215, its Rule 37 coun-
terpart, to impose mandatory sanctions for pretrial discovery abuses. William W. Kilgarlin,
Sanctions for Discovery Abuse: Is the Cure Worse than the Disease?, 54 TEX. B.J. 658, 658 (July
1991).
153. Advisory Committee Note on the 1983 Amendments, 97 F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983). In
1988, Rule 13 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure was adopted by the Supreme Court of
Texas to restrain the filing of groundless pleadings. William W. Kilgarlin et al., Practicing
Law in the "New Age": The 1988 Amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, 19 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 881, 882 (1988).
154. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2132 (1991); Roadway Express,
Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765 (1980); Dondi, 121 F.R.D. at 287.
155. David Margolick, At the Bar; Does 'Polite'Really Mean 'Wimpy'? Or, What Has Hap-
pened to Civility in a Once-Noble Profession?, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1991, at B9.
156. Glenna Whitley, Why We Love to Hate Lawyers, D MAG., May 1991, at 47.
157. Viewing Lawyers from Prospective Jurors' Perspective, 54 TEX. B.J. 1206, 1207 (Dec.
1991).
158. Compare Monroe Freedman, The Golden Age of Law That Never Was, TEX. LAW.,
Jan. 7, 1991, at 26 (arguing that recent changes in legal profession make previous practices
look tarnished) with Thomas M. Reavley, Rambo Litigators: Pitting Aggressive Tactics Against
Legal Ethics, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 637, 640 (1990) (stating that more professional and judicial
misconduct occurred in the early and mid-1900s than today) and Brewer & Majorie, supra
note 19, at 841 (arguing that despite recent interest, no proof reveals that the bar is less civil
today than in the past). Compare Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in
Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 524 (1986) (questioning whether behavior of attorneys today
may be consistent with behavior fifty years ago) with Dondi, 121 F.R.D. at 286 (pointing out
that sharp practices between lawyers is of relatively recent origin) and Walter K. Olson, Sys-
tem Overload, 77 A.B.A. J. 70, 70 (1991) (stating "[lthe ethics of American lawyering have
lately been in steep decline, and legal practice has gotten more ferociously adversarial") and
Bradley W. Foster, Comment, Playing Hardball in Federal Court: Judicial Attempts to Referee
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prevalent today, do these rules of the game cause more problems than they
solve? If the practice of law is more pernicious now than in the days of
Rome, one should not miss the irony. Today's terminology for inappropri-
ate lawyering was largely developed after rules were instituted to curb such
tactics. 159
Legal theorists and commentators are beginning an unprecedented reeval-
uation of the entire judicial process. 16 Most of the proposals are aimed at
pretrial and discovery practices. This is not surprising because most of the
time and expense of litigation are attributed to these aspects.' 61 Some sug-
gest adopting civility training programs, amending or enforcing existing
rules, or using civility codes.' 62 These suggestions although laudable, only
resort to traditional efforts that have been tried but have shown no measura-
Unsportsmanlike Conduct, 55 J. AIR L. & CoM. 223, 223 (1989) (commenting that lawyers
increasingly approach trial advocacy in Rambo-like fashion) and Roger J. Miner, Lawyers.Owe
One Another, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 19, 1988, at 13 (observing that dishonesty between lawyers
seems to be on the rise).
159. The first of the Sylvester Stallone Rambo films, FIRST BLOOD, was released in 1982.
FIRST BLOOD (Orion 1982). Later Rambo films include RAMBO: FIRST BLOOD PART II
(Orion 1985) and RAMBO III (Tristar 1988).
160. The Federal Judicial Center headed by Judge William Schwarzer, former Solicitor
General Kenneth Starr, and former Vice President Dan Quayle, acting for the President's
Council on Competitiveness, have each submitted proposals to reform discovery. William
Abrams, A Welcome Wrecking Ball for the Litigation System, TEX. LAW., Jan. 13, 1992, at 22.
Additionally, the Civil Justice Reform Act (the "Biden Bill") established advisory groups com-
prised of lawyers in 93 federal judicial districts to propose plans for reducing discovery delays
and costs. Id. The Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference
of the United States has proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
modify discovery rules. Thomas M. Mengler, Eliminating Abusive Discovery Through Disclo-
sure: Is It Again Time for Reform?, 138 F.R.D. 155, 155 & n.1 (1991).
161. Loren Kieve, Discovery Reform, 77 A.B.A. J. 79, 80 (Dec. 1991); William W.
Schwarzer, Slaying the Monsters of Cost and Delay. Would Disclosure be more Effective than
Discovery?, 74 JUDICATURE 178, 178 (1991). As stated by Arthur Miller, Harvard law profes-
sor and reporter for the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference of the
United States: "The chief source of frustration in processing cases is not outright rule viola-
tions or disobedience of court orders but rather sheer overuse of the system, which can take the
form of frivolous claims, sham defenses, unnecessary motions, or abuse of the discovery sys-
tem." Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 17
(1984).
162. In response to the complaints surrounding the shortcomings of Rule 11, the United
States Supreme Court has proposed amendments to the rule which are to be effective Decem-
ber 1, 1993, upon approval of Congress. AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE AND FORMS, H.R. Doc. No. 103-74, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). Compare
ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, PROPOSED RULE 11, reprinted in Bench-Bar Proposal to Revise Civil Procedure Rule
11, 137 F.R.D. 159, 171 (1991)) (citing the committee's proposed Rule I I as expanding the
certification requirement to include every "claim, defense, request, demand, objection, conten-
tion, or argument in a pleading, written motion, or other paper filed," but permits a party to
withdraw a pleading or other paper after a complaining party moves for sanctions). Rule 11 as
Proposed by the Advisory Committee on Civil Procedure, 137 F.R.D. at 171-72. Also compare
Bench-Bar Proposal tO Revise Civil Procedure Rule 11, 137 F.R.D. 159, 162 (1991). Judge
Leon Higginbotham of the Third Circuit, Judge Patrick Higginbotham of the Fifth Circuit,
Judge Mary Schroeder of the Ninth Circuit, along with Professor George Cochran and a
number of practicing lawyers believe that the Advisory Committee's proposed Rule II will
intensify the current problem of satellite litigation. Id. at 163. They propose a Rule II that
condenses the existing rule and changes sanctions from mandatory to permissive, giving the
court discretion as in Rule 37. Id. at 165-70; see also Melissa C. Nelken, Sanctions Under
A'mended Federal Rule 11 - Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation
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ble success. On the other hand, the proposals calling for a radical change of
the present discovery format, if adopted, hold promise for having the great-
est effect on the conduct of counsel.
A novel approach to remedy discovery abuses and overuses is Judge Wil-
liam Schwarzer's proposal favoring a disclosure approach.1 63 Under this
procedure, parties in a lawsuit would be required to disclose the following to
the opposition: (1) all material things and documents; (2) names and ad-
dresses of persons believed to possess material information; and (3) state-
ments relinquishing material information of persons under the plaintiff's
control. 164 This disclosure obligation would continue throughout the law-
suit and would require the parties to disclose matters promptly as knowledge
is acquired.1 65 After full disclosure, discovery would be permitted only
under a court order specifying the scope and limits of the permitted discov-
ery and the means for obtaining it.166
Judge Schwarzer's proposal could alleviate many of the current discovery
issues that arm Rambo's gun and generate calls for civility. Under current
rules, disclosure is required only after a "proper" request is made. As a
consequence, the lawyer best serves the client first by not disclosing, and
then disclosing only upon a "proper" request. Thus, the lawyer's duty to the
client directly conflicts with any notion of cooperation because the lawyer
must scrutinize each discovery request for loopholes in order to prevent dis-
closure whenever possible.167 Civility codes calling for "cooperation" se-
verely impinge on this duty.
To the contrary, under the disclosure approach advocated by Judge
Schwarzer, "the obligation to act honorably is undiluted by the kind of ethi-
cal conflict (and opportunity for evasion) presented by ambitious, inept or
objectionable discovery requests."1 68 Significantly, the disclosure approach
provides for no more discovery than already provided by the rules, it simply
does so "without the intervening discovery game."' 169 Further, this ap-
proach results in defining the issues early in the case. 170 This means that
additionally required discovery is automatically conducted in the context of
defined issues.' 7' Again, with disclosure, there is less room for game
and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1353 (1986) (arguing that Rule 1 I should track the lan-
guage of Rule 37(b)).
163. Schwarzer, supra note 161, at 178. See generally Mengler, supra note 160, at 155-65
(comparing Schwarzer's proposal with proposals from the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, criticizing both, and concluding that more rulemaking is not the answer; rather, diver-
sity jurisdiction should be abolished and more judges appointed to decrease courts' dockets).
164. Schwarzer, supra note 163, at 180.
165. Id. The use of Rule 11, protective orders, and privileges would remain available to the
parties. Id.
166. Id. at 181. The burden of proving a particularized need for discovery would be on the
party seeking it. Id.
167. Id. at 179. "Overall the discovery system creates the wrong incentives and breeds a
conflict of interest between lawyer and client." Id.
168. Id. at 183.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 182.
171. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
[W]e know that many of the rules and devices of adversary litigation as
we conduct it are not geared for, but are often aptly suited to defeat, the
development of the truth. - Judge Marvin E. Frankel173
Societal animosity surrounding the practice of law is as old as law itself.
Questionable tactics by lawyers have been recorded since the beginning of
American jurisprudence. Over the past fifty years, the trend in the law has
been to move away from trial by ambush and toward pretrial rules of proce-
dure designed to allow opposing counsel to force each other to show their
cards. The notion was undoubtedly that opening up the process would lead
to better justice - the resolution of the dispute would rest less forcefully on
lawyering and more on the truth of the facts. Since the institution of proce-
dural rules in 1938, however, citizens are no more confident in judicial out-
comes than they were before. In response, the profession has promoted the
institution of harsh procedural rules, ethical rules, and civility codes in a
continuing attempt to control the conduct of lawyers. Implemented without
careful regard, these additional obligations adversely affect the lawyer's pri-
mary duty to the client without any salutary effect on the abuses sought to
be curbed. Now, legal theorists and judicial officers are undertaking an un-
precedented reevaluation of the judicial process, with a special focus on rules
of discovery.
Lawyers and judges often state that the adversary system of justice is an
effective means to resolve conflicts by finding the truth.174 The system bases
itself on the premise that truth may be ascertained by an impartial judge or
jury when conflicting views are presented by the parties as persuasively as
possible.' 7 5 Techniques used by the advocates on each side include the use
of the investigation process, pretrial discovery, cross-examination of the
other side's witnesses, and marshalling the evidence in summations before
the judge and jury. 17 6 After being given the strongest possible view of each
172. By order of The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona dated December 20, 1991,
amending rules of civil procedure and rules of practice, a disclosure approach was imple-
mented in the state courts in Arizona. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN., RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
(1955), Court Comment to Rule 26.1(A) (1991 Am.).
173. Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1031, 1036 (1975).
174. See, e.g., Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) ("The basic purpose of a
trial is the determination of truth .... ); Pamela A. Rymer, High Road, Low Road. Legal
Profession at the Crossroads, 25 TRIAL 79, 81 (Oct. 1989) ("Our entire system of justice is a
search for truth"); Robert J. Kutak, The Adversary System and the Practice of Law, in THE
GOOD LAWYER 172, 174 (David Luban ed., 1983) (premise of adversary system is that com-
petitive analysis of facts produces a greater number of correct results); David Luban, Calming
the Hearse Horse: A Philosophical Research Program for Legal Ethics, 40 MD. L. REV. 451,
468 (1981) (one justification for adversary system is that it is "the best method for arriving at
the truth"); MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 3
(1975) (adversary system is efficient and fair method for determining truth).




side, the factfinder is theoretically in the best position to make a fair and
accurate judgment.177
At center stage in this performance is the advocate. The advocate is some-
times appreciated and loved, especially when he or she succeeds, but more
often is denounced as a "Rambo litigator," "mouthpiece," "hired gun,"
"mercenary warrior," or "shyster." 178 Hired to fight and implored to win,
the lawyer is condemned for working too devotedly at his trade. 179 The
advocate's dirty work of obstructing, perverting, distorting, and blocking the
search for truth is required in the nasty fighting for which lawyers are
commissioned. ' 80
Certainly, a fundamental irony of the adversary system is its rules drafted
to keep the truth from the judge and jury.' 8 ' For example, rules of profes-
sional conduct require lawyers not to reveal information associated with cli-
ent representation.' 8 2 Rules of evidence allow suppression of evidence
relating to the character of witnesses 8s3 and some out of court statements. 184
Lawyers assert privileges to prevent the disclosure of relevant informa-
tion. 185 Motions in limine are often filed to prevent the introduction of prej-
udicial (prejudicial because it's truthful and it hurts) matters before the
jury. 186
At the heart of all these rules are overriding policy considerations protect-
ing attorney-client relationships, maintaining the dignity of witnesses and
177. Id.
178. See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 3 (1978); Judge Sidney A. Fitzwater,
Toward a Renaissance of Professionalism in Trial Advocacy, 20 TEX. TECH L. REV. 787, 789
(1989).
179. Frankel, supra note 178, at 4.
180. Id. at 3-4.
181. For examples of rules designed to silence the truth in the criminal context see FREED-
MAN, supra note 174, at 2-3 (discussing presumption of innocence, right against self-incrimina-
tion, due process, and the State's burden of proof). Dean Freedman notes that the adversary
system only allows a partial search for truth due to the greater consideration of maintaining
the dignity of individuals accused of criminal acts. Id. at 2; Monroe H. Freedman, Judge
Frankel's Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1060, 1063 (1975).
182. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983). There are two excep-
tions. First, confidential information may be disclosed if the client is about to commit a crime
involving death or substantial physical harm to another person. Id. Second, disclosures may
be made in matters dealing with the lawyer-client relationship, such as a suit for payment for
legal services. Id. Compare Model Rule 1.6 with MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY DR 4-101 (1969) (allowing disclosures only with client consent, when required by law,
when the information is necessary to prevent the client from committing a crime, or in limited
matters between lawyer and client).
183. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
184. FED. R. EVID. 802.
185. A witness may assert the privilege against self-incrimination. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
In Texas and in many other states, privileges may be asserted to protect certain communica-
tions. See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. EVID. 503 (lawyer-client communications); TEX. R. Civ. EVID.
504 (husband-wife communications); TEX. R. CIV. EVID. 505 (clergyman-communicant com-
munications); TEX. R. CIv. EVID. 510 (communications occurring while receiving treatment
for alcohol or drug abuse). In federal civil actions, State laws regarding privileges are applica-
ble. FED. R. EVID. 501.
186. E.g., Davis v. Stallones, 750 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1987,
no writ); see also FED. R. EVID. 403 (allowing exclusion of evidence on grounds of prejudice,
confusion, or waste of time).
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defendants, preserving confidential communications, and promoting court
efficiency. Consequently, the adversary system and the rules of the game are
designed both to find the truth and to hide the truth. Although many com-
mentators -advocate changing the fundamental structure of the adversary
system, 18 7 the adversarial structure as we know it is deeply ingrained in our
culture. Further, there is no evidence that the overwhelming administrative
task of restructuring the adversary system would yield a preferable sys-
tem. 18 8 Perhaps our rules of conduct should be drafted with the fundamen-
tals of the adversary system in mind, eliminating what parties may do to
each other, and instead focusing on what must be done to advance one's own
case. The courts have tried to punish Rambo. It is now time to disarm him.
187. See, e.g., Eric E. Jorstad, Note, Litigation Ethics: A Niebuhrian View of the Adver-
sarial Legal System, 99 YALE L.J. 1089, 1103 (1990) (litigation ethics in adversarial system
should require trial lawyers to "mediate between the state's interest in the litigation and the
private parties' struggles for power through the law"); William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in
Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1090 (1988) (lawyers in adversary system should be
given discretion to consider relevant circumstances and take action most likely to advance
justice); Frankel, supra note 173, at 1052 (advocating modification of adversarial ideal to make
truth the paramount objective and to make that objective a duty imposed on contestants).





GUIDELINES OF PROFESSIONAL COURTESY
PREAMBLE
A lawyer's primary duty is to the client. But in striving to fulfill that duty,
a lawyer must be ever conscious of the broader duty to the judicial system
that serves both attorney and client. A lawyer owes, to the judiciary, can-
dor, diligence and utmost respect.
A lawyer owes, to opposing counsel, a duty of courtesy and cooperation,
the observance of which is necessary for the efficient administration of our
system of justice and the respect of the public it serves.
A lawyer unquestionably owes, to the administration of justice, the funda-
mental duties of personal dignity and professional integrity.
In furtherance of these fundamental concepts, the following Guidelines of
Professional Courtesy are hereby adopted.
COURTESY, CIVILITY AND PROFESSIONALISM
1. GENERAL STATEMENT
(a) Lawyers should treat each other, the opposing party, the court and
the members of the court staff with courtesy and civility and conduct them-
selves in a professional manner at all times.
(b) The client has no right to demand that counsel abuse the opposite
party or indulge in offensive conduct. A lawyer shall always treat adverse
witnesses and suitors with fairness and due consideration.
(c) In adversary proceedings, clients are litigants and though ill feeling
may exist between clients, such ill feeling should not influence a lawyer's
conduct, attitude, or demeanor towards opposing lawyers.
2. DISCUSSION
(a) A lawyer should not engage in discourtesies or offensive conduct with
opposing counsel, whether at hearings, depositions or at any other time
when involved in the representation of clients. In all contacts with the court
and court personnel, counsel should treat the court and its staff with cour-
tesy and respect and without regard to whether counsel agrees or disagrees
with rulings of the court in any specific case. Further, counsel should not
denigrate the court or opposing counsel in private conversations with their
own client. We should all remember that the disrespect we bring upon our
fellow members of the Bar and the judiciary reflects on use and our profes-
sion as well.
(b) Lawyers should be punctual in fulfilling all professional commitments
and in communicating with the court and fellow lawyers.
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DEPOSITIONS, HEARINGS, AND DISCOVERY MATTERS
1. GENERAL STATEMENT
(a) Lawyers should make reasonable efforts to conduct all discovery by
agreement.
(b) A lawyer should not use any form of discovery, or the scheduling of
discovery, as a means of harassing opposing counsel or his client.
(c) Requests for production should not be excessive or designed solely to
place a burden on the opposing party, for such conduct in discovery only
increases the cost, duration, and unpleasantness of any case.
2. Scheduling Lawyers should, when practical, consult with opposing
counsel before scheduling hearings and depositions in a good faith attempt
to avoid scheduling conflicts.
3. DISCUSSION
(a) GENERAL GUIDELINES
(1) When scheduling hearings and depositions, lawyers should commu-
nicate with the opposing counsel in an attempt to schedule them at a mu-
tually agreeable time. This practice will avoid unnecessary delays,
expense to clients, and stress to lawyers and their secretaries in the man-
agement of the calendars and practice.
(2) If a request is made to clear time for a hearing or deposition, the
lawyer to whom the request is made should confirm that the time is avail-
able or advise of a conflict within a reasonable time (preferably the same
business day, but in any event before the end of the following business
day).
(3) Conflicts should be indicated only when they actually exist and the
requested time is not available. The courtesy requested by this guideline
should not be used for the purpose of obtaining delay or any unfair
advantage.
(b) EXCEPTIONS TO GENERAL GUIDELINES
(1) A lawyer who has attempted to comply with this rule is justified in
setting a hearing or deposition without agreement from opposing counsel
if opposing counsel fails or refuses promptly to accept or reject a time
offered for hearing or deposition.
(2) If opposing counsel raises an unreasonable number of calendar con-
flicts, a lawyer is justified in setting a hearing or deposition without agree-
ment from opposing counsel.
(3) If opposing counsel has consistently failed to comply with this
guideline, a lawyer is justified in setting a hearing or deposition without
agreement from opposing counsel.
(4) When an action involves so many lawyers that compliance with this
guideline appears to be impractical, a lawyer should still make a good
faith attempt to comply with this guideline.
1994]
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(5) In cases involving extraordinary remedies where time associated
with scheduling agreements could cause damage or harm to a client's case,
then a lawyer is justified in setting a hearing or deposition without agree-
ment from opposing counsel.
4. MINIMUM NOTICE FOR DEPOSITIONS AND HEARINGS
(a) Depositions and hearings should not be set with less than one week
notice except by agreement of counsel or when a genuine need or emergency
exists.
(b) If opposing counsel makes a reasonable request which does not preju-
dice the rights of the client, compliance herewith is appropriate without mo-
tions, briefs, hearings, orders and other formalities and without attempting
to exact unrelated or unreasonable consideration.
5. CANCELING DEPOSITIONS, HEARINGS AND OTHER DISCOVER
MATTERS
(a) GENERAL STATEMENT Notice of cancellation of depositions and
hearings should be given to the court and opposing counsel at the earliest
possible time.
(b) DISCUSSION
(1) Calling at or just prior to the time of a scheduled hearing or deposi-
tion to advise the court or opposing counsel of the cancellation lacks cour-
tesy and consideration.
(2) Early notice of cancellation of a deposition or a hearing avoids un-
necessary travel and expenditure of time by opposing counsel, witnesses,
and parties. Also, early notice of cancellation of hearings to the Court
allows the time previously reserved to be used for other matters.
ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS
1. GENERAL STATEMENT Proposed Orders to be submitted to the court
should be prepared promptly, and should be submitted to opposing counsel
before or contemporaneously with submission to the Court.
2. DISCUSSION
(a) GENERAL RULE
(1) Unless the Order or Judgment is to be immediately submitted to
the Court, the attorney charged with preparing the proposed Order
should prepare it promptly, generally, no later than the following busi-
ness day, and should mail it to the court for entry, simultaneously mail-
ing a copy to opposing counsel.
(2) The transmittal letter to the court should advise the court to enter
the Order unless the court has heard an objection from opposing counsel
within five days from the receipt of the Order of Judgment.
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(b) EXCEPTION
(1) In the event an Order or Judgment must be entered immediately,
and hand delivery of the Order or Judgment to the Court is contem-
plated, the lawyer charged with preparing the Order or Judgment
should have a copy of the Order or Judgment hand delivered to oppos-
ing counsel the same day it is delivered to the court.
(2) If hand delivery of the proposed Order or Judgment cannot be
accomplished, then opposing counsel should be called and the proposed
Order or Judgment read to the opposing counsel.
SERVICE OF PAPERS FILED WITH THE COURT
1. GENERAL STATEMENT Lawyers should not attempt to unfairly gain
advantage by delay in service of pleadings or correspondence upon opposing
counsel.
2. DISCUSSION
(a) When pleadings or correspondence are mailed to the court, copies
should be mailed the same day to all other counsel of record, both local and
out of town.
(b) When pleadings or correspondence are hand delivered to the court
and a response is due or a hearing is scheduled within seven (7) days, or a
ruling by the court is expected promptly, such papers should be hand deliv-
ered the same day to all counsel of record in Dallas County, and should be
sent by overnight delivery to counsel residing in other cities.
AGREEMENTS AND STIPULATIONS OF
UNDISPUTED MATTERS
1. GENERAL STATEMENT
(a) Lawyers should stipulate to undisputed matters not inconsistent with
the client's interests.
(b) Lawyers should abide by all promises and agreements with opposing
counsel, whether oral or in writing.
2. DISCUSSION
(a) Lawyers should be willing to agree to and stipulate to undisputed mat-
ters to avoid unnecessary utilization of court time and inconvenience. In
doing so, the counsel seeking a stipulation should request a stipulation in
writing.
(b) Opposing counsel should promptly inform the counsel requesting the
stipulation whether the stipulation is agreeable or not so that a decision can
be made by the party seeking a stipulation as to whether a hearing will be
necessary.
(c) A reasonable time to respond to the request generally would require
no more than one week from the time the request for stipulation is received.
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(d) In the preparation of agreements, achievement of a jointly desired
common goal is often hindered by the practice of preparing draft agreements
which include terms neither desired nor insisted upon by the party. When
preparing a draft of an agreement, a lawyer should attempt to state the true
and anticipated agreement of the parties and avoid inclusion of terms which
would hinder the finalization of the agreement.
(e) It is appropriate to honor requests of opposing counsel made during
trial which do not prejudice the rights of the client or sacrifice tactical ad-
vantage. To this end, counsel could disclose the identity of the next witness
to be called, the next depositions to be read, sharing of a projector or video
tape screen, estimates of time and other matters of this nature routinely en-
countered in trial by trial counsel.
TIME DEADLINES AND EXTENSIONS
1. GENERAL STATEMENT Reasonable extensions of time should be
granted to opposing counsel where such extension will not have a material,
adverse effect on the rights of the client.
2. DISCUSSION
(a) Because we all live in a world of deadlines, additional time is often
required to complete a given task.
(b) Traditionally, members of this bar association have readily granted
any reasonable request for an extension of time as an accommodation to
opposing counsel who, because of a busy trial schedule, personal emergency
or heavy work load, needs additional time to prepare a response or comply
with a legal requirement.
(c) This tradition should continue; provided, however, that no lawyer
should request an extension of time solely for the purpose of delay or to
obtain any unfair advantage.
(d) Counsel should make every effort to honor previously scheduled vaca-
tions of opposing counsel which dates have been established in good faith.
COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE JUDGE AND
COURT PERSONNEL
1. GENERAL STATEMENT
(a) Only lawyers should communicate with the judge or appear in court
on substantive matters.
(b) Non-lawyers may communicate with court personnel regarding
scheduling matters and other nonsubstantive matters.
2. DISCUSSION
(a) Lawyers should make no attempts to obtain an advantage in a case by
an ex parte communication with the court.
(b) Lawyers should avoid arguments or posturing through unnecessary
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inclusion of the Court in correspondence. If a matter does not merit the
filing of a motion or of an agreed order, it probably does not warrant involv-
ing the judge or clerk in correspondence or with copies of correspondence to
the opponent. Only correspondence which has been requested by the Court,
or is merely filed to record the service of documents, should be sent to the
Court.
CONCLUSION
The conduct of the lawyer before the Court and with other lawyers should
at all times be characterized by honesty, candor, and fairness.

